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Abstract 
Using economic geography concepts, this paper compares four groups of investors to the conflict-
affected region of Sri Lanka and critically analyses the key factors that are “locking-in” and “locking-out” 
investment, business development and employment creation. It argues that foreign/Diaspora investors 
were mostly being influenced by political and social factors, and thus far had not invested significantly in 
the region. Traders from the non-conflict-affected region of the country had benefitted the most due to 
opportunistic  behaviour,  their  acceptance  of  the  political  realities  and  the  short-term  economic 
opportunities that had opened up. Large investors from outside the region, on the other hand, had either 
been disappointed with the economic situation or had invested due to a sense of social responsibility and 
long-term business prospects. Local SMEs within the conflict region were hit hard by the opening of the 
war-affected economy and have been unable to cope with the change. Political, economic, and social factors 
had all contributed to their unwillingness and inability to expand their businesses. The paper concludes 
that  the  climate  for  investment  must  be  improved  significantly  by creating  a  strong  “path-creating” 
environment and “de-locking” investment inhibiting factors. There must be better collaboration amongst 
different  types  of  businesses,  and  coordination  amongst  different  stakeholders.  If  done  well,  enhanced 
investment and employment creation could make a significant impact on reconciliation and long-term 
peace in the country. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the end of the warin Sri Lanka in May 2009, the conflict-affected region of the 
North and East has undergone enormous economic and social change. Low investment and 
youth unemployment had been critical factors leading up to the onset of the war and during the 
conflict. It is essential to understand how the situation has changed since the end of the war and 
the challenges that remain to generate private sector investment and employment generation. 
This is especially important because investment and employment generation in the region have 
the  potential  to  contribute  to  long-term  peace  by  creating  a  peace  dividend. The  “Northern 
market” opened for traders from the South1 allowing for more business connections amongst 
communities, and large companies from the South have also opened up retail outlets to sell their 
goods. Though some recognised that the potential for business development, investment and job 
creation in the region is strong, the degree to which this potential has been realised in the last 
four-five yearsis not yet known due to insufficient research. Past research has primarily focused 
on  the  provincial  macro-economic  situation  andthe  general  livelihood  situation  of  people. 
Overall,  there  is  a  dearth  of  literature  on  the  key  factors  that  are  currently  influencing 
investment and employment creation in the conflict-affected region.  
The  theoretical  foundations  for  this  paper  are  the  concepts  of  economic  geography, 
which  provide  key  insights  into  how  businesses  choose  to  allocate  resources  and  make 
investment  decisions.Economic  geographers  have  historically  stressed  the  importance  of 
location in business decisions. For example, Sobri and Ossai-Igwe found that location was the 
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most important factor in determining the investment and creation of small businesses in Nigeria 
(2011:  110).  Not  only  does  location  affect  economic  decisions,  but  social,  governance  and 
political factors are also affected by location. Indeed, over the last decade, economic geographers 
have increasingly been encouraged to move into multi-disciplinary studies without a focus on 
purely economic or cultural issues (Amin and Thrift, 2000 and Rodriguez-Pose, 2001). However, 
there  needs  to  be  more  empirical  studies  using  evolutionary  and  institutional  economic 
geography (Kusar, 2011). One can expect the conflict-affected region of Sri Lanka to benefit from 
investment and political decision-making in different ways from other regions in the country. 
Storper (2011) notes that “explaining the growth and change of regions and cities is one of the 
great challenges for social science” (p333). One key cause of major change is a “shock”, which 
could come in a number of forms including an opening of an economy, whereby firms may 
choose to invest and relocate to this new economy to benefit from lower production costs or 
markets (Storper, 2011:339). The end of war and opening of the economy in the North and East 
of Sri Lanka can be considered such a “shock”.   
This paper partially fills a number of gaps in the current economic geography literature. 
Importantly, there is a gap in economic geography research on how broader issues of national 
politics  affect  regional  development  (Mackinnon  et  al,  2009:  138).  Adding  to  the  existing 
literature on economic geography, this research uses fundamental concepts of “lock-in”, “path-
dependence”  and  “path-creation”,  and  analyses  the  current  investment  and  employment 
creation  situation  of  the  region  of  post-conflict  Sri  Lanka.  This  study  argues  that  political, 
economic, social and other factors affectinvestors’ decision-making in the previously conflict-
affected  region,  and  acknowledges  that  private  sector  investment  can  make  a  significant 
contribution to economic reconciliation in the country through employment generation. Overall, 
investment can be an important bridge for peace by providing jobs with high social returns, or it 
could also be the great divider depending on who benefits and who does not. The paper does 
not discuss employee perceptions of employers, nor factors affecting government’s investment. 
This paper is based on interviews in August – September 2013 with key government officials, 
investors and business leaders in the conflict-affected region of Sri Lanka. Because the study was 
largely qualitative in nature, a purposive sample of twenty-two respondents were chosen, with 
those interviewed some of the most relevant people in their respective sectors. They represented 
those from within the region who wanted to expand their businesses, those from the rest of the 
country who saw a new market and wanted to quickly benefit from early-mover advantages, 
those large investors from the South who have been looking at investment from a long-term 
perspective, and investors from outside the country with past ties to the region. 
The  interviewees  included  Presidents  of  four  district  chambers  representing  local 
businesses from the North and East, two senior bank managers from the North, and nine large 
businesses  from  the  South  which  had  invested  in  the  North  and  East,  two  senior  Tamil 
government officials whose responsibilities involve trying to improve the investment climate in 
the North and East, and two other non-governmental institutions facilitating investment in the 
country. Three informal discussions were also held with three people from the Tamil Diaspora 
who visited Jaffna from UK, Canada and Australia at the time the interviews took place. All 
interviews were held independently and confidentially. Thus, names of the individuals as well 
as institutions are not disclosed in this paper.  
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief overview of the economic situation in the 
conflict-affected region, the paper provides a theoretical overview of the literature on economic 
geography  and  how  businesses  take  decisions  on  where  to  invest.  This  is  followed  by  an 
overview of the key findings and, thereafter, detailed discussion on each of the four groups of 
businesses.   
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2. Background 
The three-decade war created a business and employment vacuum in every sector in the 
North and East. The vacuum started to fill immediately after the end of the war with many 
entrepreneurs seeing opportunities to start or expand their businesses. Indeed, since the end of 
the war, the Government of Sri Lanka has been trying to attract private investment not only into 
the North and East, but also to the country as a whole, from local as well as foreign investors, 
with mixed results. Since the end of the war, and particularly since the completion of the A9 
road, the main land route connecting the North to the South, there has been a large increase in 
inter-regional trade. However, as can be seen in Table 1 below, latest statistics from the Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka indicate that the Northern Province makes the lowest contribution in all the 
sectors except Government Services. Notably, its contribution in manufacturing is non-existent. 
It is important to note that compared to other provinces, there has been very little investment by 
the private sector into the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces. 
Table 1: Percentage Contribution by Each Province to Different Sectors of the Economy, 2011 
 
Source: Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka; Central Bank, 2013; Key: W: Western, C: Central, S: 
Southern, N: Northern, E: Eastern, NW: North Western, NC: North Central, U; Uva, S: Sabaragamuwa 
 
3. Economic Geography and Decision-Making of Investors 
Economic  geography  as  a  discipline  is  of  significant  value  in  the  study  of  regional 
development as it identifies the location as a key factor in determining the economic decisions of 
individuals and businesses (Storper, 2011:341). In many countries, it is often seen that regions do 
not benefit equally from investment, national level growth and some regions always lag behind 
others. Economic geography theory provides key insights into why regional inequalities occur 
and therefore informs the study about the kinds of economic issues that affect investment and 
improvement  of  the  employment  situation  in  a  region.  Krugman  (1998)  argues  the  forces 
thattend to promote geographical concentration of businesses (centripetal forces) such as large 
market  size  and  labour  markets,  work  against  the  forces  that  seek  to  spread  it  (centrifugal 
forces)  such  as  immobile  factors  and  high  land  rents.  So  large  regional  disparities,  such  as 
between Sri Lanka’s conflict-affected region and other reference regions thatare better off, could 
worsen depending on which forces are dominant. Though one could expect centripetal forces to 
dominate, it is possible that over time investors and entrepreneurs may feel that it may be more 
profitable  for  them  to  move  to  the  lagging  regions.  This  could  be  done  through  small International Journal of Business and Economic Development     Vol. 2  Number 2  July 2014 
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advantages given to create “lock-in” effects that become self-generating. There could also be 
factors that continue to “lock-out” investment. Though acknowledging the fact that it is essential 
to  understand  regional  differences  on  investment  and  employment  creation,  this  study, 
however, does not do a comparison of regions within Sri Lanka. Its focus is on the “lock-in” and 
“lock-out” factors affecting investment and business creation in the conflict-affected region. 
There are three sub-disciplines of economic geography that are in vogue currently: new 
economic geography, evolutionary economic geography and institutional economic geography. 
Whilst the new economic geography has provided insights on regional development primarily 
through the application to economic models, a fundamental weakness from the perspective of 
this research is its emphasis on ergodicity, which is an assumption that institutional structures 
are stable over time (Mackinnon et al, 2009: 132). This assumption cannot be accepted for this 
research  because  the  conflict  in  Sri  Lanka  has  without  doubt  created  institutional  decay, 
particularly in the North and East, and there has also been institutional change after the end of 
the war. Moreover, its assumption that actors are utility-maximising individuals without regard 
given to the “real world” context reduces the value for this research. The concept of “time” is 
also important because of the historical nature of the conflict and the post-conflict environment, 
but  new  economic  geography  generally  ignores  the  value  of  “history”  in  decision-making 
(Bochma and Frenken, 2006: 280) 
An acceptance of changing economic and political structures is important especially from 
the context of how Sri Lanka has been affected by the conflict and how the country tries to 
sustain  peace.  Therefore,  evolutionary  economic  geography  and  institutional  economic 
geography,  which  put  to  the  forefront  institutions,  path  dependence  and  “lock-in”  effects 
(Mackinnon  et  al,  2009:  133)  are  more  valuable  for  this  research.  Path  dependence  theory 
generally looks at the changes over time of industries and how trajectories of change may persist 
as the “path” become reinforcing. Theorists argue that changes to the path that firms take are 
generally  through  innovation  (Martin  and  Simmie,  2008:  184).  But  given  the  evolutionary 
background with which the theory has at its roots, processes are generally irreversible and go 
through different stages: pre-formation, path creation, path lock-in after and path dissolution 
(Martin and Simmie, 2008: 186). New paths are created based on a new context created, notably 
through a “shock”. Thus path dependence and path creation are different stages of a long-term 
process. Martin purports through his model that regional development is either on a lock-in 
path  or  one  of  continuing  evolution,  but  Drahokoupil  further  expands  this  argument  and 
suggests  that  the  two  could  in  fact  happen  simultaneously  in  a  “punctuated  co-evolution” 
(Drahokoupil, 2012:168). Thus, during a period of rapid change such as when the war ended in 
the North and East of Sri Lanka, incremental changes that were occurring until then are then 
followed by a period of intense change that can create lock-in. 
This evolutionary process does not take place without the influence of institutions, which 
are formal and informal social and political “rules” in society (Essletzbichler and Rigby, 2007; 
Nelson, 2002; Pelikan, 2003). Thus, one can easily surmise that social and political factors affect 
the decision-making of investors and businesses in new development regions. Institutions are 
“containers of socio-economic organisation” (Amin, 2001: 1237), which influence and become 
embedded in regions at different levels (Essletzbichler and Rigby, 2007: 557). Hodgson argues 
that  institutions  are  “both  objective  structures  ‘out  there’  and  subjective  springs  of  human 
agency”  (Hodgson,  2006: p6).  Pike  et  al  (2009)  contend  that  evolutionary  approaches  to  the 
study of regions can benefit greatly from a “thorough going connection with the interactive and 
holistic  capability  of  geographical  political  economy  to  connect  economic,  social,  cultural, 
ecological and political concerns” (p179). International Journal of Business and Economic Development     Vol. 2  Number 2  July 2014 
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Given that the focus of this paper is the conflict-affected region of Sri Lanka, it must be 
noted  that  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  a  region  is  not  one  that  is  based  simply  on 
administrative  boundaries.  In  economic  terms  it  can  be  defined  simply  as  “a  unit  where 
economic activity takes place” (Behrens and Thisse, 2007:460), as long as economic distinctions 
can be made amongst regions. Beyond the purely economic definition, Mackinnon et al (2009), 
quoting Paasi (1991) and Storper (1997) also suggest that it can further be considered as one that 
is “constructed and reproduced through a range of socio-spatial relations, connections, practices 
and discourses” (p129). Thus the conflict-affected area of the country can be taken as a region of 
study from multiple perspectives. It should also be noted, however, that this region could easily 
also be separated into other regions within it, such as the North and the East, or coastal region 
and inland region. Regions are never separated from each other and there is always spatial 
interaction  amongst  regions  based  on  a  number  of  factors  such  as  trade  or  goods  and 
investments (Behrens and Thisse, 2007: 460). Thus, the conflict-affected region interacts with the 
“South” as well as the external economy in distinct ways. 
Whilst many economic geographers study the interaction of firms within a region, this 
paper focuses specifically on the factors that are influencing the investment decisions  in the 
conflict-affected region. As it has been only four years since the end of the war, the “shock” to 
the regional economy through its “opening for business” needs to be understood first in terms 
of the nature of the change taking place. The region is in essence going through a new path-
creating process that would lead to lock-in of different paths and investments. Therefore, this 
paper provides insights on the key factors influencing investor decisions that will contribute to 
the  economic  path  creation  in  the  region.  Path dependence  is  place  dependent  (Martin  and 
Sunley,  2006)  and  vice  versa.  As  a  follow  up  to  this  study,  it  would  be  important  to  also 
understand  the  interactions  amongst  these  investors  in  greater  detail.  This  paper  therefore 
makes  a  preliminary  contribution  to  future studies  on the  regional  economy  of  the  conflict-
affected region from an economic geography perspective. 
 
4. Key Findings 
4.1 Summary 
The  region  is  going  through  multiple  path  creating  changes  through  business 
investment, with different groups of businesses acting and being influenced in different ways. 
The research identified a number of factors that are creating “lock-in” and “lock-out” effects for 
investors.  Table  4below  highlights  the  twentykey  factors  mentioned  as  affecting  increased 
investment to the conflict-affected region by foreign investors, Southern traders, large Southern 
investors and local SMEs. Some of the factors have become essential “lock-in” (I) factors for 
increased  investment,  whereas  others  are  thus  far  significant  “lock-out”  (O)  factors  that  are 
preventing businesses from investing in the region. Some of the factors (coloured in grey) were 
felt  to  be  irrelevant  depending  on  the  investors.  The  end  of  violence  was  seen  as  the  only 
important  factor  recognised  by all  groups  as helping  to  bring  in  investment  to  the  conflict-
affected region. All other factors varied significantly. Political factors (P) affected the foreign 
investors  and  local  SMEs  the  most,  and  it  was  mainly  to  lock-out  further  investment. 
Interestingly, political factors had no effect on Southern traders and large Southern investors. 
They  were  mostly  influenced  by  economic  factors  (E),  predominantly  the  degree  of 
improvement of government infrastructure. The importance of social factors (S) varied across all 
groups. Interestingly, law and order, presence of regulatory processes, and presence of legal 
institutions were not mentioned as important factors for investment in this region, though one 
could not entirely discount their importance. Indeed, the presence of legal rules (L) for doing 
business was considered important for foreign and large Southern investors. One geographic International Journal of Business and Economic Development     Vol. 2  Number 2  July 2014 
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factor (G) was included.Detailed analyses of the findings are given in the sections that follow 
Table 2. 
  Table 2: Key Determinants “locking in” and “locking out” Investment 
 
Key: P– Political, E– Economic, L– Legal, S– Social, G– Geographic, I– Lock-in factor, O– Lock-out factor 
  
4.2 Diaspora Investors – Waiting for Change 
Of the four groups, foreign investors, particularly from the Diaspora had been the least 
attracted  by  opportunities  available  in  the  previous  conflict-affected  region.One  would  have 
expected the Tamil Diaspora, with a close affinity to the region to come into the region in a large 
way after the end of the war, but this was not the case. Many were indifferent to the economic 
and employment issues facing the region. Those interested in the region had primarily been 
those who had a political interest in setting the “governance” agenda at the forefront instead of 
looking at the economic development of the region and ways of improving the employment 
situation.  Government  officials  in  the  North  and  East  complained  that  large  sections  of  the 
Diaspora saw devolution of power, and in the extreme case, separatism, as the biggest priority 
for the region. Significant amounts of funds were being used to promote political change and 
lobbying the international community against the government, but only a fraction of that was 
coming into the country as investment. Despite the end of the war, the region was far from 
being perceived as politically stable. Secondly, Tamil government officials in the region felt that 
another  reason  why  the  Diaspora  wasnot  interested  in  investing  was  because  they  felt  that 
increased investment would have a positive impact on the image of the government. Indeed, 
some local business leaders and politicians had purposely asked Diaspora investors who were 
interested  in  investing  to  wait  until  there  was  a  better  political  climate,  including  greater 
devolution of power. The discussions with officials in the North concluded that there appeared 
to be insufficient recognition of the economic discomfort faced by the people who were unable International Journal of Business and Economic Development     Vol. 2  Number 2  July 2014 
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to leave the region for the past thirty years. A large number of Tamils in the Diaspora  sent 
remittances to relatives in the region, but funds were mainly sent for “consumption” rather than 
“investment” and even this had started to decrease with the difficult times faced by those in 
Western countries. Currently, though there was affinity with the region, few appear to have 
plans  or  hopes  of  returning  to  live  in  the  region  and  contribute  directly  to  its  economic 
development.  
There  were  Diaspora  investors  who  had  an  interest  in  investing  and  contributing  to 
economic development. However, some officials in the region expressed their disappointment 
that many of those in the Diaspora who had an interest and come to see what opportunities 
were available had not found any “safe” investments other than purchasing land. Though many 
had recognised the improvement in infrastructure, it was still insufficient for any serious large 
investor. Also, given their lack of knowledge about the business situation on the ground in the 
North and East and the way things work there, the risks were too high. To reduce this risk, 
investments that do come from outside the country would have to have some sort of partnership 
with businessmen in the region. Interestingly the knowledge of Tamil itself was not a strong 
reason to invest in the region, though knowledge of the language had helped them talk to local 
businessmen. There was still a clear cultural mismatch between local businessmen and those 
exposed to the more formal means of doing business in Western countries. For the Diaspora 
investors, there was a need for legal rules as they may have been used to in their countries of 
residence and the potential local partners were not used to that. Many investors who had come 
into  the  region  to  invest had  not  met  “like-minded  people”  or  gained  the  trust  of  the  local 
population, as the ways of working are different. Some Diaspora investors perceived that local 
partners appeared “desperate” for partnerships, and had asked these potential local partners for 
guarantees on investment and strong management skills before funds are disbursed, but often 
potential local partners had little more to offer than an interest in partnering. They werealso 
waiting for a change in attitudes and work-practices, but that may not come in the short term.  
The only sector that had seen some investment from the Diaspora had been the tourism 
sector, partly because small hotels employed very few people and could be managed with one 
or  two  skilled  people  to  ensure  smooth  operations. Investors  had  found  that  the  quality  of 
labour  in  the  region  was  low,  both  in  terms  of  attitudes  and  skills.  Many  hotels  had 
management staff  from  outside  the  region.  Houses  owned  by  those  living  abroad  had  been 
expanded and converted into small hotels and rooms were being rented out mainly to tourists 
from  within  the  country.  Overall,  the  Diaspora’s  contribution  to  improving  the  economic 
development and youth employment situation in the region had been very low compared to its 
potential. 
 
4.3 Early Entrant Southern Traders – In Search of Quick Profits 
So far most of the businesses that had come to the conflict-affected region from the South 
were those that had wanted quick returns rather than long-term business relationships. As soon 
as the war ended, many businesses from the South, especially traders from Colombo, opened up 
branches for their goods in all districts of the North and East, and large profits were made as the 
closed economy opened up. A significant boost to trading took place when the main arterial 
land route to the North, the A9 road, opened and goods were able to move quickly and freely. 
Indeed, there have not been any factors thatcould be considered as “lock-out” factors. Southern 
traders  had  either  seen  all  political,  economic  and  social  factors  as  being  positive  or  been 
indifferent to them. This was mainly because their views had been on short-term gains. Risks 
were  largely  borne  by  facilitators  such  as  banks,  consumers  or  third-party  middlemen. 
Importantly, their actions have had a negative impact on the perception of Southern businesses 
by the local businesses in the North and East, with many believing that Southern businesses had International Journal of Business and Economic Development     Vol. 2  Number 2  July 2014 
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been  more  exploitative  and  over-competitive  than  they  should  have  been.The  group  was 
indifferent to the political challenges facing the region and to a large extent saw the region as 
simply “a market” to be tapped. The political stability that had been generated by the end of the 
war had been sufficient, and they had used their entrepreneurial ambition and creativity to find 
gaps in the market. 
In the last couple of years, the group was doing well in the region, albeit with lower 
profits than in the first two years after the end of the war. Those that faced saturated markets in 
the South and those that had managed with low fixed costs had been particularly successful. 
Consumer goods that were previously not available such as electronic goods were now common 
in  all  middle-class  homes.  Traders  of  all  types  of  goods  set  up  retail  outlets  or  provided 
opportunities  for  people  to  purchase  items  without  outright  payments.  Indeed,  with  much 
stronger marketing skills, better products and stronger networks of retail outlets compared to 
the existing local businesses, Southern businesses have optimised market opportunities. When 
possible, they had bypassed local middlemen and also given post-dated checks to retail outlets 
maximising on profits.  
Complementing  the  increased  trade  from  the  South,  many  financial  organisations 
including  banks  and  leasing  companieshad  set  up  branches  in  the  North  and  East.  These 
institutions have helped to provide access to finance and facilitate a greater influx of traders. 
Banks recognised early on that due to large remittances coming from relatives abroad, many 
middle-class families had the capacity to deposit large sums of money, which in fact has been 
the case. Encouraged by leasing companies and credit/finance arrangements to pay for goods 
over many months, there had been increased sales despite the fact that in many cases people 
have purchased goods that they could not afford over the long term.  
Whilst large profits were made by these companies early on, times have now started to 
change. As one senior banker stated, “After the war, banks thought that there would be a boom 
in  the  economy,  but  that  has  not  been  the  case.  Banks  have  given  loans  without  much 
responsibility. The problem is that this generation of businessmen has not seen a proper banking 
system and not been disciplined. Nobody is there to guide them. Banks should have been more 
careful after understanding the ground level situation.” This clearly shows that even institutions 
that  were  generally  risk  averse  assumed  that  money  could  be  lent  and  self-employment 
initiatives would be undertaken with prudence. Whilst banks had wanted to be seen as doing 
something  for  the  conflict-affected  region,  they  have  now  sacrificed  their  reputation  and 
credibility amongst the beneficiaries who blame them for giving them loans. 
 
4.4 Strategic Large Southern Investors – Focus on Infrastructure, Incentives and 
Tapping the Labour Pool 
Like the Southern traders, large local investors from the rest of the country had, to a 
large degree, been satisfied with the general political climate and the lack of devolution was not 
of significance to them. The improvement in infrastructure, particularly the road network was 
mentioned as being an important incentive for investors to come into the region. These large 
investors  had  also  benefitted  from  lucrative  loans  from  banks  due  to  their  reputation.  The 
government officials had a close hand in facilitating the approval of legal procedures, and as one 
investor said, “it was only a matter of time” when they would be given approvals, rather than if 
they would be given them.  
Nevertheless, whilst they saw a number of positive factors enabling them to decide to 
invest, there were also a number factors keeping investment out. Many large businesses from 
the South that were interested in a long-term investment, like some foreign investors, appeared 
to  be  waiting  for  the  optimal  time  to  invest  as  the  region  developed  more  and  perhaps International Journal of Business and Economic Development     Vol. 2  Number 2  July 2014 
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government incentives were given. Indeed, industrialists, except for a selected few, had hardly 
been visible.  
On the whole, the government was providing the same general package of incentives to 
potential investors to the North and East as they did for those in the rest of the country. Notably, 
five large garment investors from the South had been given leased land at concessionary rates in 
the North, but the infrastructure around those areas were currently far from optimal and many 
were yet to receive suitable access roads and in some cases water supply. It was clear from 
discussions  with  these  investors  that  one  of  the  main  reasons  these  companies  had  set  up 
factories there was mainly because of “social responsibility” rather than business profit. Indeed, 
profit margins were and will probably continue to be low compared to their other plants in the 
rest of the country for all these businesses, but given the long-term nature of their investments 
that appears not to be a priority. These investors, encouraged by the government, felt that they 
needed  to  play  their  part  in  improving  the  economic  wellbeing  of  those  in  the  region. 
Government officials mentioned that the companies were also keen to choose regions that were 
poorer because they needed a lower skilled work force that could be trained. It was believed 
that higher skilled and educated persons may not stay and may have higher expectations about 
jobs. Indeed, there was a perception that youth from Jaffna and Vavuniya (the two largest towns 
in the North) were not interested in working hard because of remittances from relatives abroad 
and their emphasis was on higher education as opposed to achievement in employment as a key 
measure of success.   
The lack of good facilities at the Trincomalee harbour was the main reason for several 
large  Southern  investors  who  visited  the  East  to  be  discouraged.  The  second  important 
constraint was the lack of land to set up large investments.The third big constraint was the lack 
of suitable skilled employees. Many large investors felt that all skilled staff would have to be 
brought  in  from  outside  the  region  to  take  on  positions  if  an  investment  was  made.  Some 
garment  factories  had  been  attracted  to  the  region  particularly  because  of  the  low  skilled 
labour.Like in the case of the Diaspora investors, the sector that had fared very well in terms of 
investment had been the tourism sector, but at a larger scale.However, youth attitudes about 
work and tourism had made it difficult to employ suitable people. Whilst this was changing 
slowly since the sector was well established in the region now, much more needed to be done on 
changing youth attitudes, especially by helping to create hope. 
Whilst  the  government  has  made  a  significant  contribution  to  improve  the  large 
infrastructure,  more  effort  was  required  to  understand  the  needs  of  these  large  businesses. 
However, other than infrastructure investments by the government, the North and East hadalso 
benefitted from other support from external donors to facilitate improved investment and job 
creation for youth. Thus far, a bilateral development agency through one of theirprograms has 
invested Rs.57 billion in 21 companies and generated 2,200 direct jobs and 2,350 indirect jobs for 
youth. It sought a good balance between Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim enterprises and catalysed 
Rs.111 billion in investment from the 21 companies. The need for this kind of facilitation appears 
to be essential to bring in new large Southern investors, but at the same time it was also essential 
to ensure that new investments from outside did not destroy existing local businesses. If not for 
this  facilitation,  some  businesses  felt  that  it  was  difficult  to  expect  established  medium  size 
businesses to invest in production from the North. As one investor said speaking of another 
facilitation agency, “We would not have made investments in the north if not for a facilitator”. 
Another  said,  “We  needed  someone  to  control  the  suppliers  so  that  our  supply  would  be 
regular.  In  the  beginning,  it  was  very  difficult,  but  now  things  are  smooth.”  Despite  these 
efforts, this kind of facilitation was only available for a selected few investors. If the region was 
to benefit more from investment, more politically independent facilitators are needed.  International Journal of Business and Economic Development     Vol. 2  Number 2  July 2014 
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4.5 Local Businesses –Continued traditions and uncertainty, and unexpected 
indebtedness 
For the local businesses, with the end of the war and opening up of the economy, profits 
have declined despite expectations that there would be an improvement. Despite many being 
pleased with the end of the war, the political change they had expected had not come through, 
but with the influx of traders from the South, the economic change had been significant. The 
local businesses had remained traditional, unwilling to change with the increased competition 
from the South. Perceiving that improved incomes and business was an entitlement due to them 
after the end of the war, local business had remained rooted in the old ways of doing business. 
Overall, these businesses had been largely unable to cope with the change. 
Those  in  Jaffna,  the  biggest  town  in  the  North,  hadbeen  very  politically  conscious 
throughout the conflict and seen many periods of loss and gain. The businesses thatprofited 
most before the end of the war were those that had strong political connections to politicians 
from the North. Prices were generally set and businesses had the power to decide on the supply 
of  the  products,  and  consumers  had  hardly  any  choices.  Importantly,  as  local  businesses 
functioned  without  much  competition  for  many  years,  there  had  hardly  been  any  sort  of 
business strategies used to improve their businesses. As a group, they believe that the political 
situation was a strong prerequisite for improved business and it was essential for a reduction in 
army presence in the region. Their inability to access finance at concessionary rates to expand 
businesses  and  good  skilled  workers  had  made  them  very  uncompetitive.  They  also  lacked 
entrepreneurial skills and attitudes, perhaps partly because of the closed economy in which they 
operated for many years. 
It must be noted that the three-decade war had not consistently been a period of war, 
and it was difficult for local businesses to forget that they hadexperienced temporary periods of 
peace that have later resulted in resumption of conflict. When the war started in 1983, the period 
in 1987 when the Indian Peace Keeping Force came into the North, and later when the Jaffna 
peninsula was taken over by the army in 1990 brought in economic instability. Moreover, in 
1995 the land route to the rest of the country was cut and businesses had to manage in an 
increasing localised market. The ceasefire in 2002-2003 significantly improved business profits 
and brought high expectations that there would be long-term peace, but again this was not to be 
when the LTTE broke the ceasefire and restarted the war. Even now, despite the end of the war 
and  the  first  democratically  elected  provincial  council  in  place,  the  continued  heavy  army 
presence is a reminder that the region is still coming out of the horrors of war. 
Due to the war, there had been a large exodus of local business people, and those who 
remainedwere largely the vulnerable and the less skilled. A large cross-section of those with 
entrepreneurshipskills, money and influence had left the region. They had settled in Colombo or 
abroad and sought a better life. With a continuous cycle of departures, the best skilled in the 
region  continued  to  move  out.  Those  who  remained  were  traditional  in  their  outlook  and 
uncomfortable with change. Because of the lack of novel technology and business acumen from 
outside, they had fared very badly in the “open market” that had previously been closed and 
protected them from outside competitors.There was a perception by the local community that 
Southern business facilitators such as banks were not helping those in the North.Indeed, the few 
that were benefiting from business facilitation including seed capital and market linkages were 
doing a lot better than others. 
Overall, with their success in the closed market, optimism that business would further 
expand  had  been  met  with  failure  in  many  cases.  Few  had  succeeded  in  competing  with 
Southern  businessmen  and  been  able  to  use  the  loans  successfully.  Many  local  partners  to 
Southern traders had been taken advantage of with local businesses having to bear most of the International Journal of Business and Economic Development     Vol. 2  Number 2  July 2014 
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risks of failure. For example, local retail outlets facing low sales have been told to take on more 
stock by distributors, putting the burden of sales squarely on the shoulders of local businesses 
rather  than  Southern  distributors.  Large  amounts  of  stock  were  left  unsold  in  many  retail 
outlets. Local businesses, eager for more sales did not realise the danger of increased stocks with 
lower sales and the difficulties they would face. There had been hardly any respectable business 
people to act as role models for new entrepreneurs from the region. The only role models are 
those “successful” relatives abroad. Within the group, there were very few relatives who could 
be considered as successful businessmen, who could come back and become role models for the 
young entrepreneurs.  It is essential that businesses of the youth in the region succeed so that the 
region can evolve beyond the “dependency mentality”. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Overall, the investment, business development and employment creation environment in 
the previously conflict-affected region has been far below what was probably expected at the 
time of the war. The investment trajectory created by the “shock” of the end of the war has been 
largely sub-optimal, and the “path creation” continues to be in dynamic flux. It is clear that the 
path dependency of the effects of the war continue to hold back Tamil businesses from both the 
region as well as from the Diaspora.Whilst all investors are pleased that the war is over, there 
are clearly a large number of factors that are preventing greater investment in the region.  
The growth of the region and its ability to create a strong environment to provide a peace 
dividend to the people of the region as well as profits to businesses requires de-locking many of 
the inhibiting factors specific to each of the groups. Some factors may take several years, if not 
decades for them to change, but the seeds of this change must be sown early to ensure a positive 
trajectory. Moreover,  businesses  as  well  as  the government  will  be  required  to  change  their 
approach to ensure that they contribute better to the development of the region.   
Political factors, particularly the need for greater devolution of power and a reduction of 
army presence were felt to be important by the Diaspora investors and the local SMEs in the 
region.  Three  of  the  most  important  economic  factors  were  access  to  finance,  availability  of 
skilled workers and presence of business facilitators. If these factors could be improved greater 
investment will come into the region, particularly from large local investors from the  South. 
There  were  a  number  of  social  and  cultural  factors  that  were  reducing  the  improvement  of 
investment. This was particularly the case of local SMEs, which had seen their highly protected 
business practices becoming uncompetitive in the current business climate. Their inability to 
change with the times had been a particularly large drawback.De-locking the political factors to 
allow greater investment will require the political leadership amongst all major political parties, 
particularly the government and the main opposition Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance, 
to find an amicable and long-lasting solution to the long-standing ethnic issue. The ability of 
these parties to create confidence will have long-lasting effect of foreign direct investment and 
local business confidence. 
In the current context, all businesses, investors and institutions appear to be working in 
isolation and the economic situation is not looked at holistically. Indeed, when one looks at the 
key  economic  factors  that  need  to  be  de-locked,  it  is  clear  that  there  needs  to  be  strong 
coordination and responsibility by businesses of all types in its investment agenda to meet the 
economic needs of the region, especially in relation to youth employment. Stronger coordination 
will  require  better  communication,  better  research  on  the  ground  situation,  and  time  and 
collective  action  by  multiple  stakeholders.  The  private  sector  representatives  from  different 
groups need to work hand in hand with business facilitators and government officials to ensure 
success.  The  government  could  do  more  to  provide  the  incentives  that  could  encourage 
businesses to invest in the conflict-affected region. At the moment, the path forward has not International Journal of Business and Economic Development     Vol. 2  Number 2  July 2014 
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been locked-in, but as this study indicates the factors that will contribute to the future growth is 
known. But, the path to be created is one where investment helps to sustain peace in Sri Lanka. 
Given its relevance to long-term peace and stability in the country, and its impact on 
employment in the region, more research is required on private investment in the North and 
East  of  the  country.  It  would  be  particularly  useful  to  undertake  a  quantitative  survey  to 
compare the lock-in and lock-out factors given in this paper, and understand the weightage of 
each factor. The literature on economic geography would also benefit from further research on 
the interaction of these groups of investors, and how the location specific issues are affecting 
their interaction.  
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